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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact on asset prices from a reduction in the long-term capital gains tax
rate  using  an  equilibrium  approach  that  considers  both  demand  and  supply  responses.  We
demonstrate that the equilibrium impact of capital gains taxes reflects both the capitalization effect
(i.e., capital gains taxes decrease demand) and the lock-in effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease
supply). Depending on time periods and stock characteristics, either effect may dominate. Using the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event, we find evidence supporting a dominant capitalization
effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital
gains tax rate and a dominant lock-in effect in the week after the rate reduction became effective.
Nondividend paying stocks (whose shareholders only face capital gains taxes) experience higher
average returns during the week the capitalization effect dominates and stocks with large embedded
capital gains and high tax sensitive investor ownership exhibit lower average returns during the week
the lock-in effect dominates. We also find that the tax cut increases the trading volume during the
week immediately before and after the tax cut becomes effective and in stocks with large embedded
capital gains and high tax sensitive ownership during the dominant lock-in week.
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Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in? 
 
I. Introduction  
This paper jointly tests two effects of capital gains taxation on equity trading: a 
demand-side capitalization effect and a supply-side lock-in effect.  Previous studies have 
tested these effects separately, but, to our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate 
them jointly and empirically document the relative dominance of each effect surrounding 
an event of a tax rate change.  Employing an equilibrium approach, we show that in 
general their net tax effect on asset prices is ambiguous.  Evaluating returns and trading 
volume around the 1997 reduction in the capital gains tax rate, we find evidence of the 
capitalization  and  the  lock-in  effects  jointly  affecting  trading.    In  particular,  the 
capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect in the week following an increase in the 
probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate, as buyers respond to information 
that future capital gains tax rates will be lower. The lock-in effect, on the other hand, 
dominates the capitalization effect after the rate reduction actually became effective.   
Taxation is one of the most prevalent market frictions in financial markets.  It 
affects investors’ decisions and distorts the valuation of assets. Capital gains taxes, in 
particular,  play  an  important  role  in  determining  an  investor’s  trading  strategies  and 
ultimately  can  affect  asset  prices.  Because  investors  endogenously  respond  to  the 
imposition of capital gains taxes, the tax effect on asset prices can be complicated and 
difficult  to  measure.  In  his  review  of  taxes  in  the  finance  literature,  Graham  (2003) 
concludes  that  “Though  intriguing  in  theory,  the  profession  has  made  only  modest 
progress  in  documenting  whether  investor  taxes  affect  asset  prices…we  need  more 
evidence  about  the  importance  of  personal  taxes  affecting  asset  prices…”  To  date, 
research on the effects of investor level capital gains taxes on asset prices has produced 
conflicting results. Several studies report that the presence of capital gains tax reduces 
stock  price  and  current  stock  return  (see  Guenther  and  Willenborg  (1999),  Lang  and 
Shackelford  (2000),  Ayers,  Lefanowicz,  and  Robinson,  (2003),  among  others),  while 
other studies document that imposing capital gains tax increases stock price and current 
stock return (see Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, (1980), Landsman and Shackelford 
(1995), Reese (1998), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Klein (2001), Blouin, Raedy, and   3 
Shackelford  (2003),  Jin  (2006),  Ellis,  Li,  and  Robinson  (2006),  among  others).    The 
former is referred to as the capitalization effect of taxes and is often justified by the 
argument that investors would demand a lower price to buy the assets if they have to pay 
capital  gains  taxes  in  the  future.  The  latter  is  referred  to  as  the  lock-in  effect  and  is 
attributed to investors requiring higher prices to sell assets if they have to pay taxes on 
selling them. Recognizing that the two effects work in opposite directions, the purpose of 
this paper is to understand the interaction of the two effects and the circumstances under 
which one effect dominates the other surrounding a tax rate change.    
Theoretical studies on taxes and asset pricing have been scarce and often focus on 
trading strategies for investors to avoid paying capital gains taxes and their impact on 
asset  prices  when  investors  face  embedded  capital  gains  on  their  asset  holdings.  For 
example,  Constantinides  (1983)  shows  that  investors  can  rebalance  their  portfolios 
without triggering capital gains taxes if they are allowed to sell short assets in which they 
have embedded gains. This allows investors to separate their optimal liquidation of assets 
from  their  optimal  consumption  and  investment  policies.  Klein  (1999)  introduces  a 
general equilibrium model of asset pricing with capital gains taxes when investors face 
short  sale  constraints  so  that  they  cannot  rebalance  their  portfolio  without  triggering 
capital gains taxes liability. He makes predictions about the effects of capital gains taxes 
on asset prices without explicitly solving for the equilibrium price. Viard (2000) analyzes 
the dynamic asset pricing effects and incidence of realization-based capital gains taxes. 
Under the assumption of small realization taxes, he derives the first-order conditions for 
equilibrium  asset  prices.  To  obtain  the  first-order  effects,  he  linearizes  the  first-order 
conditions around the no-tax equilibrium. He finds that asset prices are increased by the 
current  realization  tax,  to  partly  offset  the  sale  disincentive  associated  with  the  tax, 
consistent with the lock-in effect. Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) develop a trading 
model where the long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates differential creates a 
trade-off between optimal risk-sharing and optimal tax-related trading strategy.  They 
show that sellers are reluctant to sell appreciated assets sooner because they are subject to 
higher capital gains taxes.  To entice sellers, buyers must provide compensation in the 
form of higher sales prices.    4 
 In this paper, we analyze the effects of capital gains taxation on prices, while 
jointly  considering  the  capitalization  effect  and  the  lock-in  effect.    Intuitively,  the 
capitalization  argument  approaches  the  tax  effect  from  buyers’  perspective  (demand 
side),  while  the  lock-in  effect  views  the  tax  impact  from  sellers’  perspective  (supply 
side). A more complete analysis of capital gains tax effects must simultaneously allow for 
demand and supply to interact.  In equilibrium, the net effect on stock markets of the 
capital  gains  tax  will  be  the  combination  of  both  effects.  Our  study  provides  such  a 
unified  framework  and  offers  predictions  for  the  capital  gains  tax  effect  on  security 
markets.   
 Our analysis suggests that a change in capital gains taxes influences asset prices 
by shifting both the demand for assets and the supply of assets. Specifically, when the 
capital gains tax is increased, the demand curve for assets is shifted down, reflecting the 
decline in prices required to attract buyers.  An increase in the capital gains tax also shifts 
the supply curve up, reflecting the boost in prices required to entice current owners to 
sell. The equilibrium net tax effect on asset prices is ambiguous, depending on which 
effect dominates. An increase in capital gains taxes unambiguously reduces the float of 
assets (number of shares actively traded). In the event of a capital gains tax cut, the 
demand curve for the assets shifts up and the supply curve shifts down. The equilibrium 
net tax effect on asset price is still ambiguous, but the float of assets is unambiguously 
increased.  
To detail the predictions of our  analysis, suppose the capital  gains tax rate is 
reduced.    If  the  capitalization  effect  dominates  the  lock-in  effect,  stock  prices  will 
increase  leading  to  higher  current  stock  returns.  Conversely,  if  the  lock-in  effect 
dominates the capitalization effect, we predict that stock prices will decrease and lower 
current stock returns.  These effects are likely to apply to all stocks traded on the stock 
market and constitute the market wide capital gains tax effect on stock prices. 
Furthermore,  the  capital  gains  tax  effect  will  vary  depending  upon  the 
characteristics of stocks because of their differences in tax costs. For instance, growth 
stocks (i.e., stock whose valuation depends largely on future dividend growth) are more 
likely  to  face  capital  gains  taxes  than  income  stocks  (i.e.,  those  stocks  currently 
distributing dividends).  Consequently, in the event of a capital gains tax cut, growth   5 
stocks should experience even higher returns than income stocks when the capitalization 
effect dominates the lock-in effect. For stocks with large price appreciation and a high 
percentage of tax sensitive investor ownership (such as individual investors and mutual 
funds), a capital gains tax cut will reduce investors’ tax cost of selling these stocks for 
portfolio rebalancing when the lock-in effect will dominate, leading to even lower current 
returns on these stocks. These constitute the cross-sectional effect of a capital gains tax 
change on asset prices. 
Although  the  capitalization  effect  and  the  lock-in  effect  co-exist,  the  relative 
importance of the two effects should vary around the timing of a capital gains tax rate 
change.  Specifically, in the event of a capital gains tax cut, the capitalization effect (price 
increase caused by demand shift upward) will be stronger than the lock-in effect before 
the tax cut becomes effective and the lock-in effect (price decrease caused by supply shift 
downward) will dominate the capitalization effect after the tax rate cut effective date. The 
reason for the timing difference is that investors react to changes in the probability of a 
capital gains tax rate cut before the rates actually fall. In other words, buyers increase 
their demand for stocks in response to the news of future tax cut. Conversely, because 
capital gains are taxed upon realization, tax sensitive stockholders likely will refrain from 
selling shares with embedded gains until the capital gains tax rate cut becomes effective. 
Consequently, we select different event windows for a dominant capitalization effect and 
a dominant lock-in effect in our empirical investigation.  Different event windows are 
critical for identifying the relative dominance of capitalization and lock-in. We perform 
the empirical tests of these predictions by examining return and volume responses to the 
1997 capital gains tax cut on stocks included in the CRSP dataset for the periods between 
January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997. Our empirical analysis confirms that while both 
the capitalization and the lock-in effects jointly influence asset prices, the magnitude of 
each  effect  differs  across  the  timing  of  the  tax  cut  and  stocks  with  different 
characteristics. 
The 1997 capital gains tax rate reduction provides a rare opportunity to jointly 
investigate the effects of capitalization and lock-in on asset prices.  In late April, 1997, 
information leaked that the Democratic White House and the Republican Congressional 
leadership had reached an accord to reduce the capital gains tax rate. This news preceded   6 
the actual effective tax rate by about one week. During that interim week, we find that the 
capitalization effect dominated the lock-in effect. This is consistent with individuals, the 
only shareholders benefiting from reduced rates, buying shares (through both personal 
accounts and mutual funds) as the probability of lower capital gains tax rates when they 
sell in the future increased. Conversely, we find that the lock-in effect dominated the 
capitalization effect during the week following the effective date of the tax cut.  This is 
consistent with the tax sensitive individual investors selling stocks (through both personal 
accounts and mutual funds) with large embedded gains after the tax cut became effective.  
Although consistent with our prediction, broad market movements surrounding 
the effective date may reflect other factors moving the markets during those two weeks. 
Our cross-sectional analyses, however, do provide compelling evidence about the effects 
of capitalization and lock-in.  Specifically, we find that: 
·  Non-dividend paying stocks experienced a stronger capitalization effect 
than  dividend-paying  stocks  during  the  week  the  capitalization  effect 
dominated. 
  
·  Stocks  with  large  price  appreciation  in  the  past  and  high  individual 
percentage  ownership  experienced  stronger  lock-in  effect  and  earned 
lower immediate returns during the week the lock-in effect dominated. 
 
·  Trading  volume  was  greater  during  the  week  immediately  before  and 
after the tax cut becomes effective  
 
·  Trading volume was greater for stocks with large embedded capital gains 
and a high percentage of individual and mutual fund ownership during the 
week the lock-in effect dominates. 
 
Since constructing alternative explanations for these cross-sectional findings is difficult, 
we infer from these results that capitalization and lock-in effects jointly affect market 
returns in the predicted manner.   7 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the effect of capital gains 
taxes on stock prices and its empirical implications using a simple demand and supply 
framework.  Section  3  lays  out  the  empirical  methodology  and  section  4  provides 
empirical analysis and discussions. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
     
II. Capital gains taxes and asset prices in an equilibrium framework 
  Consider an economy in which tax sensitive investors are required to pay taxes on 
appreciation in stock value upon selling. The overall tax effect on stock prices will be 
affected by both stock buyers and sellers. In the presence of the capital gains taxes, stock 
buyers will require a lower price to acquire the stock to compensate them for their future 
tax liability (the capitalization effect); while stock sellers will require a higher price to 
sell the stock to recover their current tax cost (the lock-in effect). The former will shift 
the demand for the stock and the latter will move the supply for the stock at all price 
levels.  To  demonstrate  the  effect  of  capital  gains  tax  on  stock  price,  we  use  an 
equilibrium approach based on the demand and supply framework. We assume that the 
demand curve for the stock is downward-sloping so that investors are willing to buy more 
shares of the stock at lower prices and fewer shares at higher prices, and on the other 
hand, the supply curve is upward-sloping so that investors are willing to sell more shares 
at higher prices and fewer shares at lower prices, both before and after the capital gains 
taxes.    
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a capital gains tax change on stock price and the 
interaction between the two opposing forces: capitalization and lock-in. To facilitate the 
discussion in our empirical analysis, we examine the effect on stock price of a capital 
gains tax cut. At first, suppose that the initial capital gains tax rate is 
0
C t .  The demand 
and the supply for any particular stock are depicted as D and S in the graph and the 
intersection  determines  the  equilibrium  price 0 P   and  float  of  shares  0 Q .  Now,  we 
introduce a capital gains tax cut from 
0
C t  to 
1
C t  and 
0 1
C C t t < . The demand curve shifts to 
the right from D to D’ due to increase in demand associated with the capitalization effect. 
At the same time the supply curve also shifts to the right from S to S’ due to increase in 
supply associated with the lock-in effect. In equilibrium, the new demand and supply   8 
curves intersect with each other at new equilibrium price  1 P  and new float of shares  1 Q . 
It is obvious that the new price could be higher or lower depending upon which effect 
dominates. However, the float of shares is clearly increased.  In the event of a capital 
gains tax increase, the shift in demand and supply is reversed. Consequently, the float of 
shares is unambiguously decreased. However, the change in equilibrium price remains 
ambiguous depending on which effect dominates: the capitalization or the lock-in. In the 
appendix, we formalize the demand and supply analysis and analytically demonstrate the 
effect of capital gains taxes on stock price to be ambiguous depending upon the relative 
magnitude of the capitalization to that of the lock-in. 
Our  analysis  above  has  the  following  empirical  implications.  First,  when  the 
capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect, a reduction in the capital gains tax will 
cause an increase in the stock price (higher current stock returns). This will arise when 
buyers are more responsive to an imminent capital gains tax cut than are current sellers. 
Conversely, when the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, a reduction in the 
capital gain tax rate will cause a decrease in the stock price (lower current stock returns). 
This will happen if current sellers are more responsive to the capital gains tax cut than are 
buyers. Second, the float of shares is inversely related to the capital gains taxes. When the 
capital gains tax is reduced, both the capitalization and the lock-in effects reinforce each 
other to increase the number of shares actively traded. The above implications apply to 
all stocks with embedded capital gains and thus represent market wide reactions to capital 
gains tax rate change.   
Because of different effects of capital gains taxes on stock buyers and sellers, 
stocks with different characteristics will also be affected differently in the event of a 
capital  gains  tax  change.  Growth  stocks  are  expected  to  offer  larger  future  price 
appreciation than income stocks. A capital gains tax cut will reduce the buyer’s future tax 
liability and attract more demand. These stocks will experience a greater price increase 
and higher returns than income stocks in the event of a capital gains tax cut. In general, 
dividend-paying stocks are more likely to be income stocks while non-dividend paying 
stocks are more likely to be growth stocks. This means that for the capitalization effect 
the stock returns are likely higher for non-dividend paying firms than dividend paying 
firms. From a stock seller’s perspective, tax sensitive investors holding stocks with large   9 
long-term price  appreciation will have lower current tax costs upon selling when the 
capital gains tax is reduced. Thus, tax sensitive investors will be more inclined to sell 
stocks with large embedded capital gains to rebalance their portfolio. This implies that in 
the  event  of  a  capital  gains  tax  cut,  stocks  with  large  embedded  capital  gains  will 
experience a larger price decline than will other stocks. These implications pertain to 
individual stock characteristics. We thus call them cross-sectional effects of a capital 
gains tax rate change.  
In addition, investors anticipating the capital gains tax cut may withhold selling 
shares with embedded gains before the tax cut becomes effective (seller’s strike). In this 
case,  the  supply  curve  may  remain  unchanged  or  even  move  up  from  S  to  S’’.  The 
demand and supply curve may intersect at point C or D. This will lead to a temporary 
increase  in  both  the  stock  price  and  float  of  shares.  This  may  provide  an  alternative 
explanation to a dominating capitalization effect before the capital gains tax cut becomes 
effective.  In  the  next  section,  we  empirically  test  both  the  market  wide  and  cross-
sectional effects of a capital gains tax change by jointly considering the capitalization and 
the lock-in effects. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
To empirically test the above implications, we use the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997 (TRA97) capital gains tax reduction as our event. The TRA97 lowered the top tax 
rate on capital gains from 28 percent to 20 percent for assets held more than 18 months.  
TRA97  is  particularly  attractive  as  an  event  because  the  tax  cut  was  both  large  and 
relatively unexpected.  Often tax legislation follows a protracted process with gradual 
changes in the probability of a particular bill becoming a law.   In TRA97, however, 
Congress  provided  researchers  with  an  attractive  research  setting  by  coming  to  rapid 
agreement on a large, unexpected reduction in capital gains tax rates. 
Having a well-defined event is particularly important in this study because we 
need  to  define  separate  event  windows  for  two  opposing  effects.  The  key  to  jointly 
identify the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect is to understand that stock buyers   10 
and sellers perceive the expected capital gains tax cut differently as we discussed above.
1 
They differ not only from required rate of return or valuation, but also from when they 
react to the news/event.  
A buyer, in order to capture the expected tax cut benefit, will react to the capital 
gains tax cut information before the tax cut becomes effective. On the other hand, a seller 
who is subject to capital gains taxes will more likely sell shares with embedded capital 
gains  to  rebalance  his  portfolio  after  the  tax  cut  becomes  effective.  As  a  result,  the 
capitalization effect is more likely to dominate before the tax cut announcement and the 
lock-in effect is more likely to dominate after the tax cut becomes effective.  
For the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), little information was released 
until  Wednesday  April  30,  1997,  when  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO) 
surprisingly announced that the estimate of 1997 deficit had been reduced by $45 billion. 
Two  days  later  on  May  2,  the  President  and  Congressional  leaders  announced  an 
agreement to balance the budget by 2002 and, among other things, reduce the capital 
gains tax rate. These announcements greatly increased the probability of a capital gains 
tax  cut.
2    On  Wednesday  May  7,  1997,  Senate  Finance  Chairman  William  Roth  and 
House Ways and Means Chairman William Archer jointly announced that the effective 
date on any reduction in the capital gains tax rate would be May 7, 1997.  
Given the above background, we choose Wednesday, April 30 to Tuesday, May 6, 
1997 as the week that we expect the capitalization effect ( C WK ) to dominate as demand 
increases in reaction to the increased likelihood of a capital gains taxes cut. The same 
event window is used in Blouin, Hail, and Yetman (2005). Lang and Shackelford (2000) 
use a similar event window (April 29 to May 5, 1997). We then choose Wednesday May 
7 to Tuesday May 13, 1997 as the week that we expect the lock-in effect ( L WK ) to 
                                                 
1 If an investor has to rebalance his portfolio by adding positions in some stocks and reducing positions in 
other stocks around the capital gains tax cut period, he is more likely to add the positions when the tax rate 
cut announcement is imminent, and delay his selling until the tax rate cut is effective if he has embedded 
capital gains on the positions.  
2 There were some conflicting signals on the capital gains tax cut before April 1997 as detailed in Sinai and 
Gyourko (2004). Based on articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal they find that President 
Clinton had already said that “he might be willing to cut capital gains taxes to reach a budget compromise 
…” in the first week of February, though at that point “the Administration’s preference is for a capital gains 
tax increase.” However, on February 13 and February 23 there were additional news reports suggesting that 
the  White  House  would  accept  a  tax  cut.  We  view  the  surprising  announcement  by  the  CBO  as  the 
strongest indication for an imminent capital gains tax announcement.    11 
dominate  as  current  shareholders  sell  their  appreciated  stocks  to  rebalance  their 
portfolios.  
Another important factor is that the capital gains rate reduction only applied to 
income that is reported on personal tax returns, i.e., capital gains from the selling of 
shares  held  directly  by  individuals  or  held  indirectly  by  individuals  in  flow-through 
entities, such as mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability 
corporations that pass dividend income to investors’ personal tax returns.  Capital gains 
taxes are not levied on tax-deferred accounts (e.g., qualified retirement plans, including 
pensions, IRAs and 401(k)), tax-exempt organizations, and foreigners.  Corporations pay 
capital gains taxes; however, the rate reduction in TRA97 did not apply to corporations.  
Thus, the ensuing tests predict variation in returns based on the amount of holdings by 
individual investors and mutual funds. 
To capture the group of investors who are the most sensitive to the capital gains 
taxes, we construct proxies for the percentage of tax sensitive investor ownership of a 
stock (individual investors and/or mutual funds) using data on shares outstanding and 
shares owned by institutional investors. The data on the institutional investors’ ownership 
are  obtained  from  their  quarterly  filings  with  the  U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission (known as Form 13F).  
Let it R be firm i’s stock return at time t. To test the effect of a capital gains tax rate 
cut on stock prices, we formulate the basic empirical regression equations as follows: 
for firms with positive embedded gains 
,
_ _ * *
*
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where  C WK   represents  the  dummy  variable  for  the  week  when  we  expect  the 
capitalization effect to dominate (hereafter, we call  C WK  the capitalization week  for 
brevity),  L WK  represents the dummy variable for the week when we expect the lock-in 
effect to dominate (hereafter we call  L WK  the lock-in week for brevity), ) 1 ( - t i Div is the 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there was no dividend distribution in the 
prior year and 0 otherwise,  ) 1 ( - t i Gains is the embedded capital gains prior to time t and in 
our baseline case is measured as the past five year stock price appreciation,  ) 1 ( - t i TSO is 
the percentage of shares of stock i owned by tax sensitive investors at time (t-1) and is 
measured either as the sum of individual investor and mutual fund ownership in the most 
recent past quarter or individual investor ownership alone,  ) 1 ( - t i L is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( < - t i Gains  and 0 otherwise, Beta_marketi is stock i’s 
market return beta, Beta_momentumi   is stock i’s beta on the momentum factor, and 
Controls refer to all other variables that may affect stock returns.  
Our specifications above consider both the broad stock market reactions to the 
capital gains tax cut and the cross-sectional differences in the tax effect for different 
stocks with diverse characteristics. Intuitively, a capital gain tax cut will increase the 
demand for stock. Thus, in the event of a capital gains tax cut, the coefficient of the 
capitalization week dummy ( C WK ) will be positive ( 0 1 > b ). Similarly, for existing tax 
sensitive shareholders contemplating selling shares with embedded capital gains, a tax cut 
will induce them to sell the stock to rebalance. When the lock-in effect dominates the 
capitalization effect, a tax rate cut will lead to lower returns on stocks with embedded 
capital gains resulting in a negative sign for the lock-in week dummy variable ( 0 2 < b ). 
These constitute the broad market effect on stock prices of a capital gains tax cut. 
Firms differ in their dividend policy and growth potential (and consequently their 
future capital gains tax liability) and the size of embedded capital gains and current tax 
costs upon selling.  Thus, the magnitude of reaction to the capital gains tax cut will likely 
vary with the characteristics of these firms. Our analysis in the previous section suggests 
that in the event of a capital gains tax cut, the impact from demand side on stock return 
will be larger for growth stocks than for income stocks. This is captured by a positive   13 
interaction term (WKC*Divi(t-1)), indicating a larger price increase for growth stocks than 
income stocks during the capitalization week ( 0 3 > b ). 
On the other hand, for a current shareholder who faces a capital gains tax liability, 
a capital gains tax reduction offers a strong incentive for him to sell shares with large 
embedded  capital  gains  to  rebalance,  consequently  leading  to  large  downward  price 
pressure associated with the lock-in effect on the stock returns. Therefore during the 
week the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect, stocks with larger embedded 
capital gains and a higher percentage of tax sensitive investor ownership will experience 
lower stock returns. In our specifications above, this is captured by a negative ( 0 4 < b ) 
interaction  (WKL*Gainsi(t-1)*TSOi(t-1))  for  firms  with  positive  gains  and  interaction 
(WKL*Gainsi(t-1)*TSOi(t-1)*(1-Li(t-1))) for the specification on all firms. 
As  discussed  in  Section  II,  an  alternative  explanation  to  a  dominating 
capitalization effect in the week before the  capital gains tax cut is that tax sensitive 
investors may withhold selling stocks with large embedded gains, leading to a price run-
up. This is referred to as the “seller’s strike.” To empirically test if a price run-up in the 
week  before  the  capital  gains  tax  cut  announcement  is  caused  by  a  dominating 
capitalization effect or seller’s strike, we include in our specifications the interaction 
(WKC*Gainsi(t-1)*TSOi(t-1)). If the seller’s strike causes the price run-up, we would expect 
a positive coefficient for the interaction. Otherwise, the price increase is likely to be the 
result of a dominating capitalization effect. 
In  addition,  we  also  include  measures  of  systematic  risk  of  individual  stock 
returns to the market returns and the momentum factor in our regression analysis. This is 
motivated by the standard capital asset pricing theory and existing empirical evidence 
suggesting that systematic risks are important determinants of individual stock returns. 
Given that a tax cut is a market-wide event, the returns to the market portfolio and the 
momentum themselves will likely be affected by the event as well. Consequently, in our 
baseline specifications we include betas of the market returns and the momentum factor 
as control variables. We will discuss the results of using the beta adjusted stock returns as 
dependent variables in our robustness check later. 
Our  specification  for  all  firms  includes  two  additional  interaction  terms: 
(WKC*Gainsi(t-1)*Li(t-1)*TSOi(t-1))  and  (WKL*Gainsi(t-1)*Li(t-1)*TSOi(t-1)).  These  interaction   14 
terms focus on the responses of loss firms to the capital gains tax cut in the capitalization 
week and the lock-in week. They allow us to further identify if tax sensitive investors will 
engage in tax efficient trading in the event of a capital gains tax change. Intuitively, tax 
sensitive  investors  should  more  aggressively  sell  stocks  with  large  embedded  capital 
losses before the capital gains tax is reduced to benefit from higher tax deduction. This 
would create some downward pressure on these stocks during the capitalization week. 
Consequently,  the  coefficient  for  (WKC*Gainsi(t-1)*Li(t-1)*TSOi(t-1))  will  be  positive 
indicating that the prices of stocks with embedded losses are likely to decrease in the size 
of losses during the capitalization week because  ). 0 ( ) 1 ( < - t i Gains  On the other hand, 
since there is no lock-in on stocks with embedded losses and the capitalization effect 
remains during the lock-in week, the coefficient for (WKC*Gainsi(t-1)*Li(t-1)*TSOi(t-1)) will 
likely be negative indicating increased demand associated with the capitalization effect.  
To test the prediction on the effect of the capital gains tax cut on the float of 
shares,  we  need  to  first  provide  a  measure  for  the  float  of  stock.  Unlike  the  shares 
outstanding, the float of shares measures the number of shares actively traded and is 
usually less than shares outstanding. For example, shares owned by insiders sometimes 
are  subject  to  certain  restrictions  and  cannot  be  quickly  sold  in  the  market  thus  not 
included in the float; some long-term buy-and-hold investors are also less inclined to 
churn their portfolio for short-term price fluctuation. Their holdings are not included in 
the float during normal time.  
However, for a major event, such as a capital gains tax cut, an investor may find it 
optimal to buy additional stocks and/or to sell some stocks with a large price appreciation 
to rebalance his portfolio. Trading from these investors is likely to temporarily increase 
trading volume.  In particular, the increase in trading volume caused by the capital gains 
tax cut is likely to be concentrated in the few weeks when the tax cut is announced.  We 
use trading volume as a proxy for the float of shares of stocks.  
Let  it v be stock i’s logarithmic weekly trading volume. Following Michaely and 
Vila (1996) and Dhaliwal and Li (2006), we first compute the excess trading volume as 
the  difference  between  the  weekly  trading  volume  at  time  t  and  the  average  weekly 
trading volume in the most recent past three months relative to the three month weekly 



























v                                                            (3) 
We then formulate our regression equations on the tax effect on the float of shares 
as follows: 
for firms with positive embedded gains 
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where the variables are defined the same as above and the controls are discussed in next 
section. 
Our prediction for stock float suggests that the coefficients for WKC and WKL will 
be positive reflecting the market wide response in trading volume to a capital gains tax 
cut.  The  interaction  term,  ( ) 1 ( - * t i C Div WK ),  will  also  be  positive  because  more  tax 
sensitive investors should buy shares of stocks with growth potentials during the week 
the  capitalization  effect  dominates.    Furthermore,  the  interaction  term, 
( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - - * * t i t i L TSO Gains WK ) will be positive because more tax sensitive investors should 
sell their holdings with large embedded capital gains to rebalance their portfolios during 
the week the lock-in effect dominates.  In our discussions of the empirical analysis, we 
use trading volume to refer to the excess trading volume for brevity.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis  
A.  Sample and Summary Statistics 
We  use  stocks  included  in  the  CRSP  dataset  between  January  1,  1990  and 
December 31, 1997. Following Lang and Shackelford (2000) we focus on weekly returns. 
Explanatory variables include dividend dummy, embedded capital gains, the percentage   16 
of individual and/or mutual fund ownership of a stock, week dummies defined to identify 
the  event  period,  measure  of  individual  stock’s  exposure  to  the  market  return 
(Beta_marketi),  measure  of  individual  stock’s  exposure  to  the  momentum  factor 
(Beta_momentumi), and various interaction terms to identify the tax effect.  
  We calculate the weekly return as follows   
) 1 log( + =￿
d
it it r R                              (5) 
where 
d
it r  is the daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday to be 
consistent  with  the  event  windows.  The  logarithmic  weekly  volume  is  similarly 
calculated as 
) log( ￿ =
d
it it Vol v                                                     (6) 
where 
d
it Vol is the daily trading volume of stock i on day t and the summation runs from 
Wednesday to the following Tuesday. We use both volumes in shares traded and in dollar 
amount for our empirical tests.  
We obtain daily stock returns and trading volume from the daily CRSP data set. 
Dividend, stock price, and shares outstanding are extracted from the monthly CRSP data 
set. To obtain the percentage of shares of each stock owned by individual investors, we 
extract institutional investors’ ownership as of March 31, 1997 from Form 13F submitted 
to the SEC by investment management companies.
3 We then compute two measures of 
the tax sensitive ownership on stock i at time t (TSOit) as follows 
the percentage of individual investor ownership (INDit) 
INDit = 1 – Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors at time t 
the percentage of individual investor and mutual fund ownership (IND&MFit) 
IND&MFit =  INDit + Percentage of shares owned by mutual funds at time t. 
We exclude non-common shares such as preferred stocks from our analysis. Firms 
with  missing  observations  are  also  removed.  For  our  baseline  case,  we  follow  Klein 
(1999, 2001) and define the embedded capital gain as the price appreciation in the last 
five years.  Specifically, the five year embedded capital gain is calculated as the price 
                                                 
3 We thank Rabih Moussawi for providing the institutional stock ownership data. Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2003), Dhaliwal and Li (2006), and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005), among many others, 
also use this measure to capture the extent to which individuals hold shares in the firm.   17 
appreciation in the past five years up to the most recent month prior to time t for each 
stock. For instance, the five embedded gain for 3/31/1997 is calculated as a stock’s price 
appreciation from February 1992 to February 1997. For robustness check, we also use 
embedded capital gains measured at two years and eight years and find that inferences 
largely hold.    
To obtain measures of exposure of individual stock returns to the market return 
and the momentum factor, for each stock, we estimate a multiple regression of the firm’s 
weekly excess return on the weekly market excess return and weekly momentum factor 
using data on these variables between 1/8/1992 to 4/16/1997.
4 The regression slope for 
the  market  return  and  the  momentum  factor  is  used  for  Beta_marketi  and 
Beta_momentumi, respectively. 
For the empirical tests, we use weekly returns in the last three years (1995, 1996 
and 1997).  Our control variables for the weekly return regressions include the dividend 
distribution dummy, the percentage of tax sensitive investor ownership, the embedded 
capital  gains,  the  interaction  terms  WKL*Gainsi(t-1),  WKL*TSOi(t-1),  WKC*Gainsi(t-1), 
WKC*TSOi(t-1), Gainsi(t-1)*TSOi(t-1), TSOi(t-1)*Divi(t-1), the size of the firm measured by the 
logarithm of firms’ market capitalization at t-1, and the calendar effect represented by 
month  and  annual  dummies.    For  the  volume  regressions,  we  use  the  dividend 
distribution dummy, the percentage of shares owned by individual investors and mutual 
funds,  firm  size,  the  interaction  terms  Gainsi(t-1)*TSOi(t-1),  Gainsi(t-1)*Divi(t-1),  and  the 
calendar effect as control variables. 
Table 1 presents the basic summary statistics for variables used in our regression 
analysis for both the subsample of firms with positive embedded capital gains and the full 
sample including firms with embedded capital losses. Each variable is defined at the 
bottom of the table. The subsample consists of information on 2,565 firms with positive 
embedded gains for the past five years and a total of 266,252 observations. The average 
weekly  return  for  firms  with  positive  embedded  capital  gains  is  0.31  percent  with  a 
standard deviation of 6.3 percent. In the meantime, the full sample including firms with 
                                                 
4 To construct the weekly momentum factor, we use the daily data on the momentum factor (Up minus 
Down or UMD) obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website. Six value-weighted portfolios formed on size 
and prior (2-12) returns are used to construct UMD. The portfolios formed monthly are the intersections of 
2 portfolios formed on size and 3 portfolios formed on prior (2-12) return. UMD is the average return on 
the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.   18 
embedded capital losses consists of 412,730 firm-week observations and has a lower 
average weekly return of 0.29 percent and a slightly higher standard deviation of 6.83 
percent. On average, about 48 percent of the firms in the gains subsample and 49 percent 
of all firms in the full sample did not pay dividends (recall that Div takes a value of one if 
the firm does not pay dividends). The average five-year price appreciation for the gains 
subsample is 210 percent with a standard deviation of 941 percent. The five year price 
appreciation is much lower at 123 percent with a standard deviation of 765 percent for 
the full sample. The five-year embedded capital gain is highly skewed with half of the 
firms gaining less than 79 percent for the gains subsample and about 27 percent for the 
full sample as indicated by the median. The average percentage of shares owned by 
individual investors is 68 percent with a standard deviation of 24 percent for the gains 
subsample. Individual and mutual funds together own 78 percent of stocks on average 
with a standard deviation of slightly less than 17 percent for the gains subsample. The 
mean and standard deviation for the individual and/or mutual fund ownership are of 
similar magnitude to those of the full sample. The average individual stock beta on the 
market return is 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.53 for and the average beta on the 
momentum factor is much smaller at 0.02 with a relatively large standard deviation of 
0.40 for the positive gains subsample. Similar mean and standard deviation are found for 
the full sample with all firms. 
The trading volume for the gains subsample has a mean of 11.7 and a standard 
deviation of 2.2 when measured in logarithmic shares. The statistics are slightly higher at 
14.4 for the mean and 2.7 for the standard deviation when measured in logarithmic dollar 
volume. The summary statistics for the trading volume for the full sample including both 
the gains and loss firms are of similar magnitude to those of the gains subsample. The 
excess trading volume has an average of 0.014 with a standard deviation of 0.72 for 
positive gains firms when measured in logarithmic shares and an average of 0.026 with a 
standard deviation of 0.75 when measured in logarithmic dollar volume. We also report 
the  summary  statistics  for  the  adjusted  weekly  return  after  removing  the  systematic 
components  associated  with  the  market  return  and  the  momentum  factor.  The  mean 
adjusted weekly return for individual stocks ranges from 0.05 to 0.07 percent with a   19 
standard deviation ranging between 6.1 to 6.7 percent for the two samples, respectively. 
The adjusted weekly return is much lower on average than the unadjusted return. 
We use generalized least squares to estimate our regression model in order to 
account for correlated residuals in regressions. Specifically, we use clustered standard 
error estimates, which are shown to be unbiased in regression analysis using panel data 
sets by Peterson (2005).
5 
 
B.  Return Tests for Joint Tax Capitalization and Lock-in Effects 
Our first set of regression results is based on equation (1) and reported in Table 2. 
The first two columns of estimates and p-values are for the percentage of tax sensitive 
ownership (TSO) measured by individual investors and mutual funds combined, while the 
last two columns measure tax sensitive ownership using individual investors only. The 
coefficients for key variables are qualitative very similar. Consistent with our predictions, 
the coefficient estimate associated with WKC is positive and statistically significant at 1 
percent. This indicates that the market reacted positively to the possibility of a capital 
gains tax cut. The weekly return for the capitalization week is 8.18 percent higher than 
the average weekly return when the tax sensitive ownership is measured by individual 
investors and mutual funds combined (IND&MF), and is 6.04 percent higher when the 
tax sensitive ownership is measured by individual investors only (IND). The estimates are 
lower than the average return reported in Lang and Shackelford (2000) for the week 
between 4/29/1997 to 5/5/1997, but reasonable given that more controls are used in our 
regression. The estimate for WKL is negative and also statistically significant at 1 percent. 
The estimated coefficient suggests that the average weekly return in the lock-in week is 
about 2.0 percent (1.0 percent) lower than the average weekly return using IND&MF 
(IND).  This  provides  empirical  support  for  a  market  wide  dominating  lock-in  effect 
during the week immediately after the capital gains tax cut became effective.    
Consistent with our predictions on the cross-sectional behavior of stock returns, 
the interaction term (WKC*Div) is positive and highly statistically significant with a p-
value less than 1 percent.  The estimated coefficient shows that non-dividend paying 
                                                 
5 We use SAS PROC MIXED procedure to estimate our models treating firm as our subject so that each 
firm is one cluster. The goodness of fit for this procedure is given by the -2 residual log likelihood.   20 
stocks yield 1.7 percent higher returns on average during the capitalization week than do 
dividend-paying stocks for the same period for both measures of tax sensitive ownership. 
Lang  and  Shackelford  (2000)  report  that  non-dividend-paying  firms  experience  4.25 
percent higher weekly return on average. The coefficient estimate associated with the 
interaction term (WKL*Gains*TSO) is negative at  34 . 0 -  percent based on IND&MF and 
negative at  22 . 0 -  percent based on IND. Both are highly statistically significant with p-
values less than 1 percent. This suggests that stocks with large embedded capital gains 
and high individual investor ownership have lower returns during the lock-in week.  The 
coefficient implies that for firms with the average percentage of individual and mutual 
fund ownership, a one standard deviation increase in five year embedded capital gains 
will yield 2.5 percent  %) 8 . 77 % 941 % 34 . 0 ( ´ ´ -  lower weekly returns during the lock-in 
week.  For  firms  with  an  average  five  year  embedded  capital  gains,  a  one  standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of individual and mutual fund ownership leads to 12 
basis points  %) 8 . 16 % 210 % 34 . 0 ( ´ ´ -  lower weekly returns during the lock-in week. 
When  the  tax  sensitive  ownership  is  measured  by  individual  investors  only,  the 
corresponding reduction in the average weekly returns during the lock-in week is lower at 
1.4 percent and 11 basis points, respectively.   
The  above  findings  are  consistent  with  both  investors  buying  stocks  as  the 
probability of a capital gains tax cut increases before the announcement and tax sensitive 
investors selling their shares after the effective date of capital gains tax cut.  Investors 
respond  by  increasing  their  demand  for  stocks  and  driving  up  prices  during  the 
capitalization week. This is particularly evident for non-dividend paying growth stocks, 
whose returns are more likely to face capital gains taxation. After the lower tax rate 
became effective, individual investors sensitive to capital gains tax liabilities were more 
inclined to sell positions with large embedded capital gains to rebalance their portfolios. 
This leads to a lower price for stocks with large embedded capital gains and a higher 
percentage of individual stock ownership during the lock-in week.   
Our findings suggest that a dominant lock-in effect is stronger in a subset of 
stocks that have both large embedded capital gains and high tax sensitive ownership in 
the  week  after  the  effective  date  of  the  tax  cut.  Given  that  TRA97  directly  affects   21 
individual investors and mutual funds with large embedded capital gains, this finding is 
consistent with our prediction on the relation between stock price and capital gains taxes.  
The  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term  (WKC*Gains*TSO)  is  positive  but 
statistically insignificant for both measures of the tax sensitive ownership. The p-value 
for the coefficient estimate is above 90 percent for both the IND&MF and IND. This 
suggests  that  there  is  no  empirical  support  for  the  seller’s  strike,  an  alternative 
explanation of the price run-up during the capitalization week.  The reason is, if investors 
were withdrawing from the market after the announcement of a rate cut but before the 
effective date, we would expect share prices to increase during the capitalization week for 
the appreciated shares that were going to be sold after the effective date.  Since the 
coefficient on interaction term (WKC*Gains*TSO) is insignificant, we infer that increased 
demand largely accounted for the increase in prices during the capitalization week, rather 
than a seller’s strike. 
Our regression analysis also provides the following findings. Consistent with the 
capital asset pricing theory, a firm’s exposure to systematic market risk has a positive 
effect on the firm’s return. The estimated coefficient for Beta_market ranges from 0.11 to 
0.12  percent  and  statistically  significant  at  less  than  1  percent  level  across  the  two 
regressions.  Firms’  exposure  to  the  momentum  factor  also  has  a  positive  effect  on 
returns. The coefficient for Beta_momentum ranges from 0.07 to 0.08 and significant at 
around 1.5 percent level for across the two regressions. Stocks with higher tax-sensitive 
investor ownership experience about 0.2 percent higher weekly returns on average. The 
interaction between WKL and the embedded capital gains is significantly positive. This 
may be caused by demand from institutional investors that did not face a capital gains tax 
cut.  
Stocks with higher tax sensitive investor ownership experience a lower average 
weekly return during the capitalization week and a higher average weekly return during 
the  lock-in  week.  Non-dividend  paying  stocks  with  higher  tax  sensitive  investor 
ownership also yield a lower weekly return on average. Firm size has a negative and 
significant effect on stock returns. 
Although  not  reported  in  the  table,  we  find  that  the  annual  dummy  is  highly 
statistically significant for year 1995 but not for year 1996.  The monthly dummies on the   22 
other  hand  are  all  statistically  significant  indicating  the  existence  of  monthly  return 
variation. Given our panel data, firm characteristic variables (gains, dividend, size and 
individual and/or mutual fund ownership) also act as controls for the fixed effect in the 
test. 
 
C.  Return Tests with all Firms 
For  firms  without  embedded  capital  gains,  the  lock-in  will  not  likely  have  a 
significant  effect  on  stock  returns.  However,  tax-sensitive  investors  with  embedded 
capital losses may sell their holdings before the tax cut becomes effective so that they can 
benefit from the higher tax rebate under higher tax rate.
6 If so, firms with embedded 
capital losses and high tax sensitive investor ownership will experience some downward 
price pressure during the week before the tax cut announcement. For these stocks, the 
price  run-up  caused  by  the  capitalization  effect,  which  increases  the  demand  from 
investors who have no existing positions in them and investors who are not subject to 
taxation, will likely be attenuated. 
On the other hand, because there is no lock-in effect on stocks with embedded 
capital losses after the tax cut announcement, the selling pressure will likely be small 
while the capitalization effect remains for these stocks. To check the robustness of our 
findings of joint capitalization and lock-in effects and to test the hypotheses on firms with 
embedded  capital  losses,  we  estimate  equation  (2)  which  incorporates  two  additional 
terms: (WKC*Gains*L*TSO) and (WKL*Gains*L*TSO) using observations on all firms. 
  Table 3 reports the regression results with the two additional interaction terms. 
Both the signs and magnitude of the effects of key variables are similar to those for firms 
with  positive  embedded  capital  gains  only.  Specifically,  the  coefficient  for  the 
capitalization week is 8.61 percent (6.42 percent) with a p-value less than 1 percent when 
the tax sensitive ownership is measured by percentage of shares owned by individual 
investors and mutual funds (individual investors only). The coefficient for the lock-in 
week  is  46 . 1 -   percent  and  76 . 0 -   percent  for  the  two  measures  of  tax  sensitive 
                                                 
6 Complex netting provisions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, govern the taxation of capital gains 
and losses (see Shackelford, 2000). That said, our predictions about  the  incentives  to sell stocks  with 
embedded capital losses before the rate fell assume that the investors can utilize the capital losses.  More 
specifically, we assume a net capital gain position, i.e., total capital gains exceed total capital losses. 
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ownership,  respectively,  and  both  are  statistically  significant  at  2  percent  level.  
Regarding  the  cross-sectional  effect  of  the  tax  cut,  we  find  that  firms  that  do  not 
distribute dividends earn 1.5 percent and 1.53 percent higher average weekly returns, 
during the week the capitalization effect dominates, for the two measures of tax sensitive 
ownership,  respectively.    This  is  slightly  lower  than  the  estimates  using  firms  with 
positive  embedded  capital  gains  only.  The  coefficient  estimate  for  the  interaction 
WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO  is  negative  at  29 . 0 -   percent  and  17 . 0 - percent  for  the  two 
measures of tax sensitive ownership, respectively, and remains statistically significant at 
3 percent level. The magnitude of the effect is again slightly lower than in the case with 
gains firms. Overall, the results for individual investors and mutual funds combined are 
stronger  than  for  individual  investors  only,  consistent  with  mutual  funds  taking  into 
account tax costs in their investment decisions. 
  The  coefficient  for  the  interaction  WKC*Gains*TSO  remains  statistically 
insignificant with a high p-value (above 90 percent) for both measures of tax sensitive 
ownership. This suggests that stocks with embedded gains do not perform significantly 
different from stocks with embedded losses during the capitalization week. This shows 
that there is no strong evidence for “seller’s strike” during the capitalization week. In 
other words, the run-up in prices during the capitalization week appears to be driven 
more  by  increased  demand  for  shares,  rather  than  a  withdrawal  from  the  market  by 
sellers. The coefficient estimates for Beta_market and Beta_momentum remain positive 
and statistically significant. The magnitudes are lower than in the case with positive gains 
firms. 
  For  the  firms  with  embedded  capital  losses,  the  coefficient  estimates  are 
consistent with our predictions. Specifically, firms with embedded capital losses (where 
Gains will be less than zero and L will take on a value of one) and high tax sensitive 
ownership earn lower weekly average returns than other firms during the week before the 
tax  cut  became  effective.  The  effect  is  statistically  significant  at  the  conventional  5 
percent test level (p-value is 2.9 percent for IND&MF and 4.8 percent for IND only). 
Firms with embedded capital losses also earn higher average weekly returns during the 
week after the tax cut takes effect. For stocks with average individual investor and mutual 
fund ownership, a 10 percent increase in embedded capital losses leads to 18 basis points   24 
%) 10 % 8 . 77 % 35 . 2 ( ´ ´ -  higher average weekly return during the week after the tax cut 
became effective.  
 
D.  Robustness Tests 
In this section, we perform robustness checks on our findings documented above. We 
focus on alternative measures of embedded capital gains and an alternative measure of 
stock returns that adjusts for the market return risk and the momentum factor as in a 
conventional event study. Specifically, we re-estimate equation (2) measuring embedded 
capital gains as the price appreciation in the past two years and past eight years. We also 
re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using adjusted individual stock returns that remove the 
systematic components attributed to the market returns and the momentum factor. In all 
of our robustness tests, tax sensitive ownership is measured as the percentage of shares 
owned by individual investors and mutual funds. 
  Table 4 reports the results for two year and eight year embedded capital gains for 
all firms, respectively. The signs of the coefficient estimates for all key variables remain 
the same as for the baseline case with five year embedded capital gains. The coefficient 
estimates  are  also  all  statistically  significant  for  the  key  variables  except  for  the 
interaction (WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO) for the two year embedded gains measure. This is 
attributed to the relatively small embedded gains for a relatively short holding period. 
Indeed, our calculation indicates that the average two year embedded capital gain is only 
78 percent, which is substantially lower than the average five year embedded capital gain 
of 210 percent. There are 42 percent of firms with two year embedded losses compared to 
35 percent of firms with losses when the embedded capital gains is calculated using the 
past five year price appreciation. Consequently, the lock-in effect is much weaker with a 
two year holding period than with a five or eight year holding period. The interaction 
(WKC*Gains*TSO)  remains  statistically  insignificant  for  both  two  and  eight  year 
embedded  gains  measures,  indicating  no  evidence  for  seller’s  strike  at  these  holding 
periods either. On firms with embedded losses at two year holding period, the coefficient 
estimate for the lock-in week has the predicted sign and is statistically significant but the 
coefficient  estimate  is  insignificant  for  the  capitalization  week.  With  an  eight  year 
holding period, the estimated coefficients for both the capitalization week and the lock-in   25 
week have the correct signs but are statistically insignificant at the conventional five 
percent level.  
  In Table 5 we report the regression results for both positive gains firms and all 
firms when the dependent variable is measured as the adjusted individual stock returns. 
To construct the adjusted individual stock returns, we subtract the systematic components 
(Beta_market*Market  return)  and  (Beta_momentum*Momentum  factor)  from  the  raw 
individual  stock  returns.  Again,  the  signs  of  the  estimated  coefficients  for  all  key 
variables remain the same as for the baseline  cases reported in Tables 1 and 2. The 
estimated coefficients for all key variables are also statistically significant except for the 
interaction (WKC*Div). The other significant change is the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimate for WKC. It is reduced from around 8 percent to about 2 percent. Both changes in 
the estimated coefficients for WKC and (WKC*Div) can be attributed to the fact that the 
market return and the momentum factor themselves are also affected by the event of the 
tax  cut.  Indeed,  our  regression  results  discussed  earlier  consistently  show  that  stock 
returns across the broad market are higher during the capitalization week. This implies 
that the market return itself is higher during the capitalization week. Therefore, given that 
individual  firms  have  positive  exposure  to  the  market  returns  on  average,  when  we 
remove  the  systematic  component  associated  with  the  market  returns  we  effectively 
reduce the price run-up in the adjusted returns. One could argue that because the market 
returns and the momentum factors are also affected by the capital gains tax cut event, to 
examine the overall effect on individual stock returns it is important not to remove the 
systematic components associated with these factors. From that perspective, Tables 2 and 
3 show the complete effects of a capital gains tax cut on stock returns. 
   
E.  Trading Volume Tests for Joint Tax Capitalization and Lock-in Effects 
Next, we test the impact of the tax cut on trading volume. Table 6 shows the 
results of the regression analysis for firms with positive embedded gains only and all 
firms using both trading volume in shares and in dollar amount. Consistent with our 
predictions,  both  the  capitalization  week  and  the  lock-in  week  exhibit  higher  trading 
volume both in logarithmic shares and logarithmic dollar amount. The effect is highly 
statistically significant with p-value less than 1 percent. The estimated coefficient for the   26 
capitalization  week  is  consistently  above  2  percent.  Specifically,  when  the  trading 
volume is measured by logarithmic shares, the excess volume is about 2.5 percent higher 
for both the positive gains subsample and the full sample than average trading volume for 
the capitalization week. The excess trading volume is about 2 percent higher than average 
trading volume for the capitalization week when measured by logarithmic dollar amount. 
The estimated coefficient for WKL suggests that the trading volume is about 0.55 percent 
higher  for  the  lock-in  week  than  the  average  trading  volume  when  measured  by 
logarithmic shares. The increase in trading volume is slightly smaller at about 0.4 percent 
on the logarithmic dollar amount. The finding holds for both the positive gains subsample 
and the full sample.   
The  coefficient  estimate  for  the  interaction  term  WKC*Div  is  statistically 
insignificant at the 5 percent p-value level. Consistent with our prediction on the cross-
sectional effect of a capital gains tax cut on trading volume, the estimated coefficient for 
the    interaction  term  WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO  is  positive  and  highly  statistically 
significant at p-value less than 1 percent. Stocks with large embedded capital gains and 
high tax sensitive investor (individual investor and mutual fund) ownership experience 
higher  trading  volume  during  the  lock-in  week.  Specifically,  for  the  positive  gains 
subsample, a one standard deviation increase in five year embedded capital gains leads to 
0.63 percent  %) 8 . 77 % 941 086 . 0 ( ´ ´  higher trading volume on the logarithmic shares 
during the lock-in week for firms with average percentage of individual investor and 
mutual fund ownership. For firms with the average five-year embedded capital gains, a 
one standard deviation increase in the percentage of individual investor and mutual fund 
ownership increases the trading volume by 0.03 percent  %) 8 . 16 % 210 086 . 0 ( ´ ´ on the 
logarithmic shares during the lock-in week. For the full sample consisting of all firms, the 
increase  in  the  trading  volume  in  logarithmic  shares  is  0.53  and  0.018  percent, 
respectively. The results are similar when the trading volume is measured in logarithmic 
dollar  amount.  For  instance,  for  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  five  year 
embedded  gains,  the  trading  volume  increase  by  0.48  percent  for  the  positive  gains 
subsample and 0.39 percent for the full sample for firms with average individual investor 
and mutual fund ownership. Our findings are consistent with investors selling shares of   27 
stocks with large accumulated capital gains to rebalance their portfolio after the lower 
capital gains tax takes effect.   
The interaction term (WKC*Gains*TSO) has an insignificant effect on the trading 
volume  for  both  the  positive  gains  subsample  and  the  all  firm  full  sample.  This  is 
consistent with our finding on the return tests of the seller’s strike. As in the return tests, 
we  incorporate  two  additional  interaction  terms:  (WKC*Gains*L*TSO)  and 
(WKL*Gains*L*TSO) in the regression with all firms. As we discussed in the return tests 
with loss firms, investors may sell shares with embedded capital losses before the tax cut 
to benefit from higher tax rebate under higher tax rate. Therefore, the coefficient for 
(WKC*Gains*L*TSO) will likely be negative because the Gains is less than zero for loss 
firms. After the tax cut becomes effective, because there is no lock-in effect on firms with 
embedded capital losses, the capitalization effect is likely to increase the demand and the 
coefficient for (WKL*Gains*L*TSO) will also likely be negative. While the estimated 
coefficients for the two additional interactions terms have the correct sign in three out of 
four  cases,  they  are  not  statistically  significant  at  conventional  test  level.  While  not 
reported  in  the  table,  other  control  variables  have  little  effect  on  the  excess  trading 
volume. Annual and monthly dummies are all statistically significant as in the return 
tests. 
Our findings on the effect on the trading volume of a capital gains tax cut are 
consistent with the results reported in Blouin, Raedy,  and Shackelford (2003). Using 
announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the Standard and Poors 500 index 
as their events, they document that trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved 
by deferring the sale of appreciated asset values. In our case, as the capital gains tax is 
reduced,  the  incremental  taxes  saved  will  decrease.  This  will  lead  to  an  increase  in 
trading volume.  In other words, in their case holding period incentive causes current 
shareholders to restrain from selling shares, which shifts supply to the left. In our setting, 
current shareholders sell some stocks with embedded gains to rebalance their portfolios, 
leading to the supply curve shifted to the right.   
   28 
V. Conclusions  
We analyze the effect of capital gains taxes on returns and trading volume using 
an equilibrium approach that incorporates both the capitalization effect and the lock-in 
effect. Extant studies separately test the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect.  To 
our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  to  jointly  model  and  test  both  effects.    Our  analysis 
predicts  that  in  the  presence  of  capital  gains  taxes,  the  net  effect  on  asset  prices  is 
ambiguous. If the capitalization effect dominates (is dominated by) the lock-in effect, the 
stock price decrease (increase).  The relative strength of the capitalization effect and the 
lock-in  effect  depends  on  the  time  period  surrounding  a  tax  rate  change  and  firm 
characteristics,  such  as  dividend  policy,  growth  potential,  and  the  percentage  of  tax 
sensitive  individual  ownership.  The  number  of  shares  actively  traded  increases 
(decreases) as the capital gains tax rate decreases (increases). 
We empirically test our predictions using weekly returns and trading volume from 
January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997, focusing on the 1997 capital gains tax rate cut. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find evidence of both the capitalization and the lock-
in effect.  In particular, the capitalization effect dominates the lock-in effect the week 
between news of the rate reduction and the effective date of the rate cut, (4/30/1997-
5/6/1997), reflecting anticipation of the proposed tax cut making it into law. Weekly 
stock  returns  are  on  average  higher  by  about  8  percent  than  average  weekly  returns 
during the capitalization week.  Moreover, non-dividend paying stocks have higher stock 
returns during the capitalization week (about 1.6 percent) than dividend paying stocks. 
In contrast, the lock-in effect dominates the capitalization effect during the first 
week after the rate reduction becomes effective (5/7/1997-5/13/1997). The weekly stock 
returns are on average 1 to 2 percent lower during the lock-in week.  Stocks with large 
embedded  capital  gains  and  high  percentage  of  individual  investor  and  mutual  fund 
ownership experience lower returns on average during the lock-in week. A one standard 
deviation increase in the five year embedded capital gains leads to 2.5 percent lower 
weekly returns during the lock-in week for firms with average percentage of individual 
investor and mutual fund ownership.  
Stocks experience higher trading volume during the week immediately before and 
after the tax cut becomes effective. Stocks with large embedded capital gains for the past   29 
five years and high individual ownership also show higher trading volume, consistent 
with  increased  supply  for  these  stocks.  The  results  are  robust  for  both  measures  of 
volume in shares and in dollar amount. All these findings are consistent with our model 
predictions. 
This paper joins an emerging literature in financial economics (see Reese [1998], 
Guenther  and  Willenborg  [1999],  Poterba  and  Weisbenner  [2001],  and  Klein  [2001], 
among  others)  in  providing  evidence  that  personal  capital  gains  taxes  affect  equity 
trading.  Together, these papers challenge a common assumption in financial economics 
that shareholder taxes are irrelevant in pricing stocks.  Although the inferences that can 
be drawn from these papers are limited to the settings that they examine, their findings 
call for additional research to examine whether equity prices vary as shareholder taxes 
change and with the mix of taxable and non-taxable shareholders.    30 
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Appendix: A simple model of the effect on stock price of capital gains tax  
 
Investors in the economy trade multiple stocks indexed by i. To facilitate our 
exposition, we introduce the following notations. Let  it P  be the time t market price of 
stock i,  it D  be the dividend distributed in period t on stock i,  it B  be the time t tax basis of 
the investor who currently owns stock i,  g t  be the capital gains tax rate, and  d t  be the 
dividend tax rate. We denote 
D
it P  as the price willing to pay for a share of stock i by 
buyers at time t and 
S
it P  as the price willing to accept for a share of stock i by sellers at 
time t. Thus, 
D
it P  and 
S
it P  represent the demand and supply curves at time t, respectively. 
As in Section II, We assume that the demand curve for the stock is downward 
sloping while the supply curve for the stock is upward sloping. Furthermore, we assume 
that investors’ demand for the stock is determined by the expected payoff of investing in 
the stock and the supply is determined by investors’ reservation value of the stock and the 
immediate tax cost upon selling.  
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                        (A1) 
where  i r  is the discount rate applied to the cash flow of stock i and 1 + it G  represents the 
investors’ anticipated capital gain realization. We assume that the anticipated capital gain 
realization takes the following form: 
), ( 1 1 it it i it P P G - = + + a                                    (A2) 
where  ] 1 , 0 ( Î i a . This specification takes into account that investors who purchase the 
shares have to pay the market price, which serves as the basis for computing buyers’ 
capital gains taxes when they sell in the following period.
7 Moreover, parameter  i a  is 
used to allow investors to use tax efficient trading strategies to reduce their realized 
capital gains.
8  
                                                 
7 This will be the case if the investor uses the last-in and first-out (LIFO) rule in calculating his tax liability. 
8 This also allows sellers to have tax basis different from the current price.   33 
  On  the  other  hand,  to  characterize  the  supply  curve,  we  assume  that  sellers’ 
reservation value of the stock (excluding the tax cost) is a fraction of current market price 
of the stock to simplify the derivation. Specifically, a typical tax sensitive shareholder 
with embedded capital gains, who contemplates selling, will require a price high enough 
to compensate him for his reservation value and tax liability. This implies: 
g it it it i
S
it B P P P t r ) ( - + =                          (A3) 
where  it i P r  represents the seller’s net-of-tax reservation value for a share of stock i and 
g it it B P t ) ( -   is  the  seller’s  capital  gains  tax.  We  assume  that  the  seller’s  net-of-tax 
reservation value is less than the market price  ) 1 0 ( £ < i r  because the tax burden is 
borne by both sellers and buyers in equilibrium.
9 
In  equilibrium,  the  demand  for  the  company  shares  equals  the  supply  of  the 
shares, and the price paid by the buyer equals the price received by the seller (including 




it P P =                                    (A4) 
Substituting (A2) into (A1) and using the market clearing condition (A4), we 
arrive at the following equilibrium price for stock i in the presence of taxes 
.
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Assuming that the dividend  ij D  grows at a constant rate  i d and the tax basis  ij B  
grows at rate i b , we have the following simplified expression for the price of stock i at 
time t: 
                                                 
9  1 = i r only when the capital gains tax rate is zero.   34 
g i i i i i i i
it g i
g i i i i i i i
d it
it b r b r
B r
d r d r
D
P
t a a r
t
t a a r
t
) 1 ( ] ) 1 [(
) 1 (
) 1 ( ] ) 1 [(
) 1 ( 1
+ - + + - +
+
+
+ - + + - +
-
=
+ .                 
  (A7) 
Denote the first term in equation (A7) as “Xi” and the second term as “Yi”. Taking the 
first derivative of “Xi” and “Yi” with respect to g t , respectively, yields: 
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Equation (A8) is unambiguously negative and we call this capitalization effect of 
the capital gains tax because the term X includes dividend and dividend growth which 





 with respect to 









,  is also negative. Hence, the magnitude of the capitalization 
effect becomes larger as the dividend growth rate of a company ( i d ) increases and the 
dividend tax rate ( d t ) decreases. This implies that in the event of a tax cut growth stocks 
will experience larger price increase than income stocks.  
The sign of Equation (A9) depends upon the size of the investors’ embedded 










.                                       (A10) 
The above inequality suggests that the lock-in effect depends positively on stock 
i’s discount (or capitalization) rate and the investor’s net-of-tax reservation price but is 
inversely related to the rate at which investors’ tax basis grows.   If we interpret the 
capitalization rate as the average appreciation rate of the stock price, then the left-hand-
side measures the size of embedded capital gains. If the appreciation rate is high and the 
investor  demands  a  high  reservation  price  relative  to  the  tax  basis  growth  rate,  the 
embedded capital gains are large and inequality (A10) will be satisfied. In this case, there   35 
is a positive lock-in effect.  On the other hand, if the appreciation rate is low and the 
investors demand a very low reservation price relative to the tax basis growth rate, the 
investors will have little embedded capital gain or even a capital loss and there will be no 
lock-in effect.  To empirically identify a dominant lock-in effect, we need to focus on 
stocks with large embedded capital gains for tax sensitive investors.  
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Overall,  because  the  capitalization  effect  ( 0 < ¶ ¶ g i X t )  and  the  lock-in  effect 
( 0 > ¶ ¶ g i Y t ) work in opposite direction, the net effect of capital gains tax on stock 
price is ambiguous. If the capitalization effect dominates, the net effect of capital gains 
tax on stock price will be negative; if the lock-in effect dominates, the net effect of 
capital gains tax is positive.   36 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables    Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 
Panel A: firms with positive embedded gains 
 
Wret_raw (%)    0.3104  0.0000  6.2960  -181.44  135.73 
Vol    11.6678  11.7448  2.1799  4.6051  19.1538 
$vol    14.3994  14.3232  2.6909  3.8474  23.7085 
Size    12.2155  11.9715  2.0472  6.9157  19.0198 
Div    0.4811  0.0000  0.4996  0.0000  1.0000 
Gains(5-year)    2.1045  0.7902  9.4135  0.0009  1041.00 
IND    0.6833  0.7232  0.2356  0.0000  0.9999 
IND&MF    0.7784  0.8091  0.1682  0.0904  1.0000 
Beta_market    0.6025  0.5635  0.5345  -1.4465  2.6963 
Beta_momentum    0.0196  0.0274  0.4026  -3.1574  1.5292 
Adjret (%)    0.0728  -0.0177  6.1407  -180.61  134.72 
AdjVol    0.0140  -0.0013  0.7222  -5.7668  5.3690 
Adj$Vol    0.0341  0.0138  0.7513  -5.6760  6.2128 
 
Panel B: all firms 
 
Wret_raw (%)    0.2894  0.0000  6.8263  -188.87  179.17 
Vol    11.7174  11.7875  2.1648  4.6051  19.1538 
$vol    14.2302  14.1294  2.7316  2.2380  23.7085 
Size    12.0967  11.8605  2.1190                 5.2587  19.3035 
Div    0.4931  0.0000  0.4999  0.0000  1.0000 
Gains(5-year)    1.2322  0.2727  7.6477  -0.9834  1041.00 
IND     0.6887  0.7258  0.2294  0.0000  0.9999 
IND&MF    0.7804  0.8110  0.1657  0.0904  1.0000 
Beta_market    0.6039  0.5597  0.5410  -1.4986  2.6963 
Beta_momentum    0.0146  0.0235  0.4050  -3.1574  1.5292 
Adjret (%)    0.0476  -0.0401  6.7033  -189.01  179.43 
AdjVol    0.0140  -0.0043  0.7231  -5.7668  5.3690 
Adj$Vol    0.0258  0.0024  0.7514  -5.6760  6.2128 
 




it r R  and 
d
it r  is the daily return and t runs 
from Wednesday to the  following Tuesday; Vol is the sum of daily logarithmic volume running from 
Wednesday to the following Tuesday; Size is the logarithm of the market value in prior month; $Vol is the 
sum  of  daily  logarithmic  dollar  volume  running  from  Wednesday  to  the  following  Tuesday;  Div  is  a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company did not pay any dividend in the prior year, zero 
otherwise;  Gains  measures  the  5-year  holding  gains  as  of  prior  month;  and  IND  is  the  percentage  of 
individual ownership, calculated as one minus the percentage of shares held by institution investors as of 
the prior quarter; IND&MF is the percentage of shares owned by individual investors and mutual funds in 
prior quarter; Beta_market and Beta_momentum are the beta estimates of regressing weekly individual 
stock returns on the market return and the momentum factor; and Adjret is the adjusted weekly return after 
removing the systematic components associated with the market return and the momentum factor.  Adj Vol 
(Adj $Vol) is computed difference between the current weekly volume and the average weekly volume in 
shares  (dollar  amount)  in  the  past  three  months  relative  to  the  three  month  weekly  average  volume 
(equation (3)).    37 
Table 2: Return Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In---positive gains firms 
 
Individuals  and Mutual Funds  Individuals only  Variables  Predicted 
signs  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
WKC  +  8.180  (0.0001)  6.044  (0.0001) 
WKL  -  -1.999  (0.0044)  -1.003  (0.0111) 
WKC*Div  +  1.684  (0.0001)  1.685  (0.0001) 
WKL*Gains*TSO   -  -0.339  (0.0001)  -0.217  (0.0036) 
WKC*Gains*TSO    0.016  (0.9055)  -0.004  (0.9691) 
Beta_market  +  0.113  (0.0002)  0.119  (0.0002) 
Beta_momentum    0.082  (0.0145)  0.073  (0.0140) 
Div    0.066  (0.5458)  -0.135  (0.0553) 
TSO    0.223  (0.0095)  0.211  (0.0012) 
Gains    0.006  (0.0302)  0.004  (0.0178) 
WKL*Gains    0.274  (0.0001)  0.147  (0.0075) 
WKL*TSO    2.446  (0.0099)  1.363  (0.0299) 
Gains*TSO    -0.013  (0.0397)  -0.012  (0.0287) 
WKC*TSO    -7.537  (0.0001)  -5.541  (0.0001) 
TSO*Div    -0.536  (0.0001)  -0.323  (0.0008) 
WKC*Gains    -0.018  (0.8149)  -0.008  (0.8823) 
Size    -0.030  (0.0003)  -0.026  (0.0013) 
Sample size    266,252  266,252 
-2 residual log likelihood    -720,502  -720,504 
 




it r R  and 
d
it r  is the 
daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. WKC is the week from 4/30/1997 to 
5/6/1997; WKL is the week from 5/7/1997 to 5/13/1997; Div is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the 
company did not pay any dividend in the prior year, zero otherwise; Gains measures the 5-year holding 
gains  as  of  the  prior  month;  and  TSO  is  the  tax  sensitive  investor  ownership  measured  either  by  the 
percentage of shares owned by individual investors and mutual funds (IND&MF) in the prior quarter or 
individual  investors  alone  (IND);  and  Beta_market  and  Beta_momentum  are  the  beta  estimates  of 
regressing weekly individual stock returns on the market return and the momentum factor.  
 
All the estimates are in percentages; year dummies and month dummies are included in all specifications to 
control for possible calendar effects; model (1) uses the percentage of shares owned by both individual 
investors  and  mutual  funds  as  the  measure  of  tax  sensitive  ownership;  and  model  (2)  uses  individual 
investors only as the measure of the tax sensitive ownership. Table 3: Return Tests for Tax Capitalization and Lock-In---for all firms 
 
Individuals and Mutual Funds  Individuals only  Variables  Predicted 
signs  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
WKC  +  8.614  (0.0001)  6.420  (0.0001) 
WKL  -  -1.464  (0.0100)  -0.755  (0.0223) 
WKC*Div  +  1.498  (0.0001)  1.525  (0.0001) 
WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO  -  -0.285  (0.0004)  -0.174  (0.0308) 
WKC*Gains*TSO    0.013  (0.9222)  -0.005  (0.9670) 
WKC*Gains*L*TSO  +  2.302  (0.0291)  2.338  (0.0477) 
WKL*Gains*L*TSO  -  -2.352  (0.0059)  -2.335  (0.0134) 
Beta_market  +  0.073  (0.0079)  0.074  (0.0074) 
Beta_momentum    0.072  (0.0259)  0.072  (0.0257) 
Div    0.040  (0.6712)  -0.161  (0.0094) 
TSO    0.106  (0.1461)  0.090  (0.1036) 
Gains    0.004  (0.1090)  0.003  (0.0385) 
WKL*Gains    0.241  (0.0001)  0.128  (0.0226) 
WKL*TSO    1.607  (0.0388)  0.833  (0.1213) 
Gains*TSO    -0.009  (0.1592)  -0.008  (0.0969) 
WKC*TSO    -7.687  (0.0001)  -5.671  (0.0001) 
TSO*Div    -0.469  (0.0001)  -0.246  (0.0040) 
WKC*Gains    -0.019  (0.8109)  -0.009  (0.8586) 
Size    -0.025  (0.0005)  -0.023  (0.0013) 
Sample size    412,730  412,730 
-2 residual log likelihood    -1,051,713  -1,051,711 
 




it r R  and 
d
it r  is the 
daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. WKC is the week from 4/30/1997 to 
5/6/1997; WKL is the week from 5/7/1997 to 5/13/1997; Div is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the 
company did not pay any dividend in the prior year, zero otherwise; Gains measures the 5-year holding 
gains  as  of  the  prior  month;  and  TSO  is  the  tax  sensitive  investor  ownership  measured  either  by  the 
percentage of shares owned by individual investors and mutual funds (IND&MF) in the prior quarter or 
individual investors alone (IND); L is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the embedded gain (Gains) 
is less or equal to 0 and takes value of 0 otherwise; and  Beta_market and Beta_momentum are the beta 
estimates of regressing weekly individual stock returns on the market return and the momentum factor.  
 
All the estimates are in percentage; year dummies and month dummies are included in all specifications to 
control for possible calendar effects; model (1) uses the percentage of shares owned by both individual 
investors  and  mutual  funds  as  the  measure  of  tax  sensitive  ownership;  and  model  (2)  uses  individual 
investors only as the measure of the tax sensitive ownership.   39 
Table 4: Robustness check---for all firms with different holding periods 
 
Holding period=2 yrs.  Holding period=8 yrs.  Variables  Predicted 
signs  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
WKC  +  8.712  (0.0001)  8.538  (0.0001) 
WKL  -  -1.606  (0.0088)  -1.945  (0.0016) 
WKC*Div  +  1.029  (0.0003)  0.917  (0.0038) 
WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO  -  -1.408  (0.1069)  -0.344  (0.0140) 
WKC*Gains*TSO    -0.450  (0.7167)  -0.047  (0.7880) 
WKC*Gains*L*TSO  +  -1.805  (0.2839)  2.081  (0.0672) 
WKL*Gains*L*TSO  -  -3.905  (0.0176)  -1.465  (0.1297) 
Beta_market  +  0.072  (0.0090)  0.112  (0.0002) 
Beta_momentum    0.068  (0.0347)  0.062  (0.0635) 
Div    0.058  (0.5442)  -0.020  (0.8455) 
TSO    0.089  (0.2281)  0.153  (0.0460) 
Gains    -0.058  (0.2580)  0.001  (0.3756) 
WKL*Gains    1.307  (0.0918)  0.310  (0.0134) 
WKL*TSO    1.753  (0.0294)  2.423  (0.0040) 
Gains*TSO    0.052  (0.3755)  -0.006  (0.1757) 
WKC*TSO    -8.344  (0.0001)  -7.648  (0.0001) 
TSO*Div    -0.485  (0.0001)  -0.350  (0.0061) 
WKC*Gains    0.829  (0.4650)  0.106  (0.4589) 
Size    -0.026  (0.0004)  -0.022  (0.0021) 
Sample size    415,129  339,230 
-2 residual log likelihood    -1,052,269  -903,111 
 




it r R  and 
d
it r  is the 
daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. WKC is the week from 4/30/1997 to 
5/6/1997; WKL is the week from 5/7/1997 to 5/13/1997; Div is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the 
company did not pay any dividend in the prior year, zero otherwise; Gains measures the 5-year holding 
gains as of the prior month; and TSO is the tax sensitive investor ownership measured by the percentage of 
shares owned by individual investors and mutual funds (IND&MF) in the prior quarter; L is a dummy 
variable that takes value of 1 if the embedded gain (Gains) is less or equal to 0 and takes value of 0 
otherwise; and  Beta_market and Beta_momentum are the beta estimates of regressing weekly individual 
stock returns on the market return and the momentum factor.  
 
All the estimates are in percentage; year dummies and month dummies are included in all specifications to 
control for possible calendar effects; model (1) uses the embedded capital gains calculated based on the 
past two year price appreciation for the prior month; and model (2) uses the embedded capital gains 
calculated based on the past eight year price appreciation for the prior month.   40 
Table 5: Robustness check---with market and momentum adjusted returns 
 
Positive gains firms  All firms  Variables  Predicted 
signs  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
WKC  +  2.266  (0.0019)  2.343  (0.0003) 
WKL  -  -2.181  (0.0018)  -1.755  (0.0019) 
WKC*Div  +  0.469  (0.1671)  0.336  (0.2180) 
WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO   -  -0.339  (0.0001)  -0.294  (0.0001) 
WKC*Gains*TSO    -0.004  (0.9708)  -0.037  (0.7191) 
WKC*Gains*L*TSO  +      3.221  (0.0026) 
WKL*Gains*L*TSO  -      -2.109  (0.0133) 
Div    0.021  (0.8486)  -0.028  (0.7824) 
TSO    0.382  (0.0001)  0.301  (0.0002) 
Gains    0.005  (0.0374)  0.004  (0.1409) 
WKL*Gains    0.277  (0.0001)  0.250  (0.0001) 
WKL*TSO    2.678  (0.0045)  1.989  (0.0101) 
Gains*TSO    -0.012  (0.0505)  -0.007  (0.2281) 
WKC*TSO    -2.467  (0.0131)  -2.136  (0.0146) 
TSO*Div    -0.592  (0.0001)  -0.527  (0.0001) 
WKC*Gains    0.010  (0.8559)  0.027  (0.6370) 
Size    -0.051  (0.0001)  -0.050  (0.0001) 
Sample size    266,252  412,730 
-2 residual log likelihood    -733,330  -1,066,052 
 
The  dependent  variable  is  Adjret  the  weekly  stock  return  after  removing  the  systematic  components 
associated with the market return and the momentum factor from the weekly individual stock return where 




it r R , 
d
it r  is the daily return and t runs from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. WKC 
is the week from 4/30/1997 to 5/6/1997; WKL is the week from 5/7/1997 to 5/13/1997; Div is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the company did not pay any dividend in the prior year, zero otherwise; 
Gains measures the 5-year holding gains as of the prior month; and TSO is the tax sensitive investor 
ownership  measured  by  the  percentage  of  shares  owned  by  individual  investors  and  mutual  funds 
(IND&MF) in the prior quarter; L is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the embedded gains (Gains) 
is less or equal to 0 and takes value of 0 otherwise.  
 
All the estimates are in percentage; year dummies and month dummies are included in all specifications to 
control for possible calendar effect; model (1) uses firms with positive five year embedded capital gains 
only; and model (2) uses all firms.   41 










Variables  Predicted 
signs 
Positive gains firms  All firms 
WKC  +  2.454  2.024  2.495  2.108 
    (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
WKL  +  0.549  0.403  0.558  0.439 
    (0.0015)  (0.0046)  (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
WKC*Div  +  -0.546  -0.494  -0.389  -0.329 
    (0.0864)  (0.0615)  (0.1773)  (0.1715) 
WKL*Gains*(1-L)*TSO   +  0.086  0.066  0.088  0.065 
    (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0043)  (0.0055) 
WKC*Gains*TSO    0.008  0.002  0.0003  -0.007 
    (0.7192)  (0.8895)  (0.9883)  (0.6440) 
WKC*Gains*L*TSO        -0.752  -0.469 
        (0.5363)  (0.6481) 
WKL*Gains*L*TSO        -0.025  0.443 
        (0.9673)  (0.4557) 
WKC*Gains*L*Div        1.515  1.333 
        (0.2176)  (0.2019) 
Size    -0.012  -0.023  -0.044  -0.033 
    (0.1706)  (0.0060)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Sample size    226,923  352,672 
-2 residual log likelihood    -617,566       -698,031  -960,094        -1,071,277 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage excess trading volume either measured in logarithmic shares (1) 
or logarithmic dollar volume (2); WKC is the week from 4/30/1997 to 5/6/1997; WKL is the week from 
5/7/1997 to 5/13/1997; Div is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company did not pay any 
dividend in the prior year, zero otherwise; Gains measures the 5-year holding gains as of the prior month; 
and TSO is the tax sensitive investor ownership measured by the percentage of shares owned by individual 
investors and mutual funds (IND&MF) in the prior quarter; and L is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 
if the embedded gain (Gains) is less or equal to 0 and takes a value of 0 otherwise. 
 
All estimates are in percentages; p-values are in parentheses; year and month dummies are included in all 












Figure 1:  Effects of capital gains taxes on asset price and share float. (P0, Q0) is the 
equilibrium  price  and  quantity  for  the  capital  gains  tax  rate 
0
C t   and  (P1,  Q1)  is  the 
equilibrium price and quantity for the capital gains tax rate 
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